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Abstract
Civil aviation safety regulations and guidance mate-
rial classify Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) as ei-
ther Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) or
Autonomous Aircraft Systems (AAS). This distinc-
tion is based on the premise that the effective safety
risk management of UAS is dependent on the degree
of autonomy of the system being operated. However,
it is found that there is no consensus on the concept of
autonomy, on how it can be measured, or on the na-
ture of the relationship between Levels of Autonomy
(LoA) and the safety-performance of UAS operations.
An objective of this paper is to evaluate existing
LoA assessment frameworks for application in avia-
tion safety regulations for UAS. The results from a
comprehensive review of existing concepts of auton-
omy and frameworks for assessing LoA are presented.
Six case study UAS were classified using the pub-
lished LoA frameworks. The implied LoA of UAS for
existing modes of operation (e.g., teleoperation, semi-
autonomous) were also assessed using the published
frameworks.
It was found that the existing LoA assessment
frameworks, when applied to the case study UAS,
do not provide a consistent basis for distinguishing
between the regulatory classes of RPAS and AAS.
It was also found that the existing regulatory defini-
tion of an autonomous aircraft is too broad, covering
UAS of significantly different levels of capability and
system complexity. Within the context of aviation
safety regulations, a new LoA assessment framework
for UAS is required.
Keywords: Autonomy, Unmanned Aircraft Systems,
UAS, Regulation
1 Introduction
A classification scheme establishes the foundation for
a regulatory framework for civil Unmanned Aircraft
* Mr BP Williams is on secondment to the Queensland Uni-
versity of Technology from Boeing Research & Technology -
Australia (Email: brendan.p.williams@boeing.com).
Systems (UAS). The components of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regulatory clas-
sification framework relevant to the regulation of civil
UAS are shown in Figure 1. ICAO (2011) defines
an UAS as “an aircraft and its associated elements
which are operated with no pilot on board.” As illus-
trated by Point A in Figure 1, ICAO further classi-
fies UAS as being either Remotely-Piloted Aircraft
Systems (RPAS) or Autonomous Aircraft Systems
(AAS)1. Where a Remotely-Piloted Aircraft (RPA),
a component of the RPAS, is defined as:
An aircraft where the flying pilot is not on
board the aircraft.
and, an Autonomous Aircraft as:
An unmanned aircraft that does not allow
pilot intervention in the management of the
flight.
Implicit to this regulatory distinction is the
premise that the effective safety risk management of
UAS is dependent on the degree of autonomy of the
system being operated. However, there is no consen-
sus on the meaning of “autonomy”, on how it can
be measured, or on the nature of the relationship be-
tween levels of autonomy and the safety-performance
of UAS operations. Given the foundational role clas-
sification plays in the development of a regulatory
framework, further clarity on the meaning and defi-
nition of autonomy is needed in order to progress the
development of regulations and standards for UAS.
This paper presents a review of existing concepts
of autonomy with the view to evaluate their use in
the refinement of existing regulatory classifications of
UAS. A comprehensive review of the literature is un-
dertaken. The review identifies a number of defini-
tions for the general concept of autonomy. The dif-
ferences between these definitions and those of other
related concepts are discussed in Section §2. The lit-
erature review also reveals numerous possible frame-
works for assessing the degree or Level of Autonomy
(LoA) of a system (presented in Section §3). In Sec-
tion §4, the assessment frameworks are applied to six
1ICAO does not explicitly define Autonomous Aircraft System
(AAS). A definition of an Autonomous Aircraft, a component of
an AAS, is provided implying the existence of the AAS class of
UAS.
Figure 1: ICAO Regulatory Classification Framework
(focused on UAS component) (ICAO 2011)
case study UAS. The LoA determined for the case
study UAS are then compared against the LoA cor-
responding to the ICAO definition of an Autonomous
Aircraft.
ICAO (2011) also defines an Autonomous Opera-
tion. A review of the literature reveals numerous def-
initions of the UAS modes of operation. The modes
imply different LoA in the system being operated.
The modes of operation and their corresponding LoA
are briefly reviewed in Section §4.3.
Section §5 provides discussion and recommenda-
tions on a LoA framework for use in the regulation of
UAS. A summary of the key outcomes from the study
are presented in Section §6.
2 General Concepts of Autonomy
We start by exploring the common meaning of the
concepts of autonomy, autonomous and the related
notions of automatic and automated. The Oxford
English Dictionary defines autonomy as being “the
right or condition of self-government; freedom from
external control or influence; independence.” and au-
tonomous as “having the freedom to govern itself or
control its own affairs; having the freedom to act in-
dependently.” (Stevenson 2012)
On first inspection these definitions convey a sim-
ple concept of autonomy/autonomous, that which can
be defined entirely by the degree of dependency or
interaction between two entities (e.g., the human Re-
mote Pilot (RP) and an UAS).
The higher the LoA of the UAS, the less the hu-
man RP is involved in the operation and the more the
UAS subsumes the role of the human RP. It is im-
portant to recognise that in order to maintain system
performance, as the degree of independence increases,
so too does the need for the UAS to exhibit the more
complex properties that were previously provided by
the human RP (e.g., the ability of the UAS to perceive
its environment, make decisions, and to modify its be-
haviour and change its goals accordingly, etc.). Thus,
the higher the degree of independence, the higher the
implied complexity of the UAS. Ultimately, if the per-
formance of the Human-Machine System (HMS) is to
remain the same, then full autonomy would imply
that the UAS is capable of performing all of the func-
tions traditionally provided by a RP.
This leads us to the second and more common con-
cept of autonomy, that which makes the relationship
between increasing independence and the increasing
complexity of the machine explicit (e.g., see defini-
tions summarised in Table 1 of Appendix A). Evident
in these definitions of autonomy are the properties of
higher-order systems in addition to the degree of free-
dom or independence from external influence or con-
trol. Such properties can only exist in more complex
systems; those systems residing in the higher tiers of
Boulding’s General Hierarchy of Systems (Boulding
1956). Put differently, these definitions have associ-
ated the concept of autonomy with complex-system
properties such as intelligence, self-awareness, adap-
tion, and cognition etc., which are properties not
present in low-complexity systems (i.e., those clas-
sified as belonging to the tiers of frameworks, clock-
works, or thermostats in Boulding’s Hierarchy).
This provides some explanation for the ongo-
ing difficulties encountered when defining autonomy.
There are two camps. The first considers autonomy
as being completely described by the property of inde-
pendence between two entities (e.g., Clough (2002)).
This property can be identified in systems residing at
any tier in Boulding’s General Hierarchy of Systems.
The second camp makes explicit the relationship be-
tween increasing autonomy (i.e., independence) and
the increasing complexity required of the machine
in order to maintain a desired level of performance
(i.e., the increasing need for the machine to resem-
ble “people”). This second notion of autonomy is not
as clearly defined, having been associated with more
complex and equally debated system properties (e.g.,
system intelligence).
Finally, it is worth noting the difference between
autonomous and automatic. The Oxford English Dic-
tionary defines automatic as “(of a device or pro-
cess) working by itself with little or no direct hu-
man control.” (Stevenson 2012) Definitions of au-
tomated/automatic identified in the broader litera-
ture are summarised in Table 1. There is little dis-
tinguishing the notion of automatic from that of the
simpler notion of autonomous. A fully autonomous
UAS (i.e., one that is entirely independent of human
influence or control) could also be identified as au-
tomatic, and vice versa. Take, for example, a wrist-
watch. A wristwatch can be described as automatic.
Under the simpler notion of autonomy, the wristwatch
can be determined as having a high LoA as it per-
forms its task (measuring and display of time) largely
independent of the person wearing it. Whereas, using
the more complex notion of autonomy the automatic
wristwatch is likely to be assigned a very low LoA (a
wristwatch is not intelligent or adaptive, etc.).
The authors agree with Clough (2002) who advo-
cate that the property of autonomy is distinct from
other complex properties such as system intelligence.
However, the authors recognise that in order to main-
tain system performance at increasing LoA, the de-
gree of intelligence, adaptability, etc. of the machine
must also increase. A pragmatic framework for as-
sessing the LoA of a system may need to take into
consideration these additional relationships. This ap-
pears to be the (implicit) position adopted by the
majority of the assessment frameworks identified in
the literature.
3 Assessing Levels of Autonomy
Numerous frameworks for assessing the LoA of a sys-
tem have been proposed. A summary of the more
common frameworks and those that have been previ-
ously applied to UAS is provided in Table 2 of Ap-
pendix A. Some of the key points of difference be-
tween these frameworks include:
1. Measurement Scales - LoA have been expressed
using ordinal, interval and ratio measurement
scales (refer to Stevens (1946) for definitions of
scales). The majority of existing frameworks
measure a LoA on an ordinal scale. Measures
of the difference between LoA defined on an or-
dinal scale are not meaningful. All that can be
ascertained is whether the LoA of one system is
less than, equal to, or greater than the LoA of
another system. Interval scales permit measures
of the magnitude of the difference between differ-
ing LoA, however this difference has no ‘absolute’
reference point. Measurements made on a ra-
tio scale permit assessments of the multiplicative
difference between the LoA of different systems
(e.g., a system has twice the autonomy of that of
another).
2. Number of Levels - The number of discrete LoA
proposed for ordinal scales ranges from four to
twelve (refer to Table 2). The literature provides
limited justification for the number of levels pro-
posed.
3. Component Properties - The assessment frame-
works describe a LoA using a range of prop-
erties of the HMS. For example, the degree of
human/operator control or interaction with the
UAS, the allocation or performance of certain
functions or tasks to the human or the machine,
or the complexity of the mission or environment
in which the HMS operates. Differences in the
properties used to assess autonomy arise due to
differences in the underlying concepts of auton-
omy and differences in the context in which the
assessment frameworks are used. For example,
Clough (2002) defines a LoA assessment frame-
work for military UAS. The proposed LoA assess-
ment framework includes factors such as battle
space cognisance, targeting and multi-vehicle co-
ordination. On the other hand, the LoA frame-
work proposed by Billings (1991) was primarily
intended for the assessment of cockpit automa-
tion and hence the LoA are described in relation
to the degree of pilot control and management of
a single aircraft.
4. Measurement - Two approaches have been used
to determine the measure of the LoA:
(a) A single measure of the LoA of a system
is determined from the mathematical ‘com-
bination’ or ‘mapping’ of the independent
properties used to characterise autonomy.
For example, Kendoul (2011) determines a
LoA for an UAS by combining independent
measures of the guidance, navigation and
control capabilities of the UAS. Methods for
aggregating the component measures into a
single LoA include addition or weighted lin-
ear combination.
(b) The LoA is assessed in relation to indepen-
dent functions or contexts without aggrega-
tion into a single LoA for the system. For
example, Parasuraman et al. (2000) mea-
sure a LoA in terms of four “broad classes”
of functions. The four measures are not ag-
gregated to provide an assessment of the
overall LoA of the system.
The above differences make comparisons between
the various autonomy assessment frameworks diffi-
cult.
4 Evaluation of Assessment Frameworks
Six generic case study UAS are defined. The case
study UAS serve as test points for evaluating the ex-
isting LoA assessment frameworks. Four of the case
study UAS describe systems in use today, with the
final two UAS describing systems with capabilities
that only currently exist in science fiction2. The six
generic configurations are:
UAS A: An UAS where the Unmanned Air-
craft (UA) is capable of executing a pre-
programmed behaviour (e.g., following a se-
ries of waypoints) and where it is not possi-
ble for the Remote Pilot (RP) to interact
with the UA after launch except possibly
where to terminate flight. There is signifi-
cant human interaction in the mission plan-
ning phase, but no interaction is possible
after launch. An example of this type of
UAS are early variants of the Ryan Light-
ning Bug, a reconnaissance UAS that once
launched followed a pre-programmed route
without interaction with a RP.
UAS B: An UAS where the operation of
the UAS requires continual input from, or
interaction with, a RP. For example, an UA
where the flight control surfaces are manip-
ulated by the RP via a data link.
UAS C: An UAS where the UA, under
normal operating conditions, does not re-
quire continual input from, or interaction
with, a RP to perform its mission. The RP
may or may not interact with the UA dur-
ing the mission but interaction is possible.
The RP continuously monitors the status
and performance of the UAS. The behaviour
of the UAS can be pre-programmed before
the flight or updated by the RP during the
flight. RP interactions are predominantly
high-level and in the form of deviations to
pre-programmed behaviour (e.g., new way-
points) due to changes in the mission objec-
tives, failures in the system or changes in the
environment. The behaviour of the UAS is
deterministic. The majority of current UAS
would be described by this case study sys-
tem.
UAS D: An UAS with all the capabilities
of case study type ‘C’ UAS with the addi-
tional capability of the UAS being able to
change its behaviour in response to changes
in its environment or performance. Given
predefined goals the UAS will determine
how to achieve those goals within the con-
straints defined by the RP or system de-
signer. Constraints on the behaviour of the
UAS are static and hard (i.e., they cannot be
changed or breached by the UAS). Given the
goals and constraints the behaviour of the
UAS can be non-deterministic, although the
bounds on the behaviour are always known.
Under normal operating conditions, the RP
2The films identified by the authors are for illustrative assis-
tance in understanding the described configuration and makes no
comment in relation to the quality of the film.
has the ability to override decisions made by
the UAS. This configuration is in the R&D
stage with possible systems in flight test.
UAS E: An UAS analogous to the ficti-
tious “HAL 9000 computer” portrayed in
the novel and screenplay “2001: A Space
Odyssey” (Clarke 1968). Recall the words
from HAL “I’m sorry, Dave. I’m afraid I
can’t do that.” An UAS of this type has all
the capabilities of case study ‘D’ UAS with
the additional capability of the UAS being
able to override or deny the inputs of the RP.
The UAS maintains the initial goals and re-
mains within predefined constraints on its
behaviour (as determined by the system de-
signer or programmed before the mission).
The ability for the RP to change the goals
and/or constraints of the UAS is lost or im-
paired.
UAS F: An UAS analogous to the fictitious
“Extreme Deep Invader (EDI)” portrayed in
the Columbia Pictures film “Stealth”. For
this type of UAS, the UAS performs all of
the functions that a RP would and like type
‘E’ UAS, can operate without the need for
interaction with the RP. Interaction between
the UAS and the RP is possible but only if
the UAS so chooses. The UAS may change
its goals and/or constraints independent of
the RP.
The autonomy of an UAS can change for different
phases of flight (e.g., taxi, take-off, landing, etc), for
different functions within its mission (e.g., weapons
release) or during emergency situations (e.g., loss of
communications between the ground control station
and the UA). Systems with such a capability are said
to exhibit “adaptive autonomy”, which adds another
dimension of complexity to the regulation of UAS.
For this paper, the case study UAS are assumed to
exhibit only one LoA.
4.1 LoA of the Case Study UAS
The LoA is assessed for each of the case study UAS
and the ICAO concept of an Autonomous Aircraft.
Only those frameworks that provided a single mea-
sure of the LoA on an ordinal scale were evaluated.
In order to explore the consistency of the assessment
across different assessors, each author independently
assessed the LoA of the case study UAS. The assess-
ment was performed twice by each author to explore
the repeatability/consistency of the assessment on an
individual assessor basis. The consolidated results
from all authors are presented in Table 3 of Appendix
A.
The frameworks use different labelling conventions
for their scales. For ease of comparison Roman nu-
merals are used for all LoA assessments. The class of
lowest LoA is assigned the numeral ‘I’, the next class
of higher LoA assigned the numeral ‘II’, and so on.
A ‘-’ in Table 3 is used to indicate those instances
where the LoA of the case study UAS could not be
determined using the framework. Where a case study
UAS could be assessed as having more than one LoA,
all possible levels are indicated. An ‘NC’ in Table
3 indicates those cases where consensus between the
authors on the assessment of the LoA could not be
reached.
It should be noted that despite the use of a com-
mon labelling scheme, a direct comparison of the LoA
determined using different assessment frameworks is
not meaningful. For example, a LoA of ‘IX’ assessed
for one framework is not necessarily equivalent to a
LoA of ‘IX’ assessed using another framework. Nor
is it meaningful to measure the difference between
two LoA on any scale (refer to the Stevens (1946)
for further discussion on the limitations of measure-
ments made on ordinal scales). However, meaningful
observations can be made in relation to how the differ-
ent frameworks rank/order the LoA of the case study
UAS.
4.2 Analysis of Results
With reference to Table 3, it can be observed that the
greatest variation is in the assessment of the LoA of
UAS A. Under some frameworks UAS A is assigned
a very low LoA but in others it is assigned a very
high LoA (i.e., comparable to the LoA assigned to
UAS E and F ). Variability in the LoA assigned for
UAS A arises due to the different concept of auton-
omy adopted by each framework. UAS A is assigned
a high LoA in those frameworks that base their con-
cept of autonomy on the degree of independence be-
tween the UAS and the RP. This is because UAS A
can perform its mission without interaction with a
human RP. Conversely, UAS A is assigned a low LoA
in those frameworks that adopt the more complex no-
tion of autonomy as the UAS is not capable of higher-
order functions such as decision making or the ability
to change its own behaviour in response to changing
conditions.
There are a number of cases where a consensus be-
tween the authors on the LoA could not be reached
(i.e. the ‘NCs’ in Table 3). This most commonly
occurred in the assessment of the LoA for UAS C
and D. It was found that the majority of the incon-
sistencies between repeated assessments were due to
the limited guidance available on how to make assess-
ments using the proposed LoA schemes. The greatest
inconsistency between assessments occurred for LoA
frameworks that used independent metrics but pro-
vided no guidance as to how the independent mea-
sures were to be combined. For example, using the
framework proposed by Kendoul (2011), some UAS
were assessed as having a high LoA in some func-
tions (e.g., control) but low in others (e.g., guidance
and navigation). Limited guidance was provided on
how to combine the three independent measures into
a single LoA for the system. Kendoul (2011) uses
‘+’ and ‘-’ notation to “distinguish between a system
that has accomplished that AL [autonomy level] or
TRL [technology readiness level] by satisfying all its
requirements, and a system that satisfies some of the
requirements only.” A description on how the overall
LoA assignment is made, e.g., whether the system is
a ‘VII+’ or ‘VIII-’, is not provided. Often the case
study UAS satisfied some of the conditions for as-
signment to a particular LoA but not all. From the
description provided it was unclear as to whether the
independent measurement dimensions were necessary
or sufficient conditions for the assignment to a partic-
ular LoA or if other means should be used to perform
the aggregation of independent measurement dimen-
sions (e.g., minimum, maximum, majority, etc.).
Another factor contributing to the inconsistency
in the assessments was that there was insufficient in-
formation on the case study UAS. Some of the assess-
ment frameworks required detailed information about
the UAS (e.g., cognisance of surroundings, % of in-
teraction time with the RP, whether the UAS was
reliant on the Global Positioning System or could per-
form collision avoidance, etc.). Where such informa-
tion was unavailable an assessor could either indicate
that the LoA of the case study UAS could not be de-
termined or make assumptions about the case study
UAS. The latter situation contributes to the subjec-
tivity of the assessment process and in turn the po-
tential for inconsistency in the results.
There are many instances in Table 3 where it was
not possible to assign a single LoA to the case study
UAS. There were also a number of cases where the
LoA determined for the different case study UAS
overlapped. Overlap in the assessments of LoA was
most frequently encountered between UAS C and
UAS D, and between UAS E, UAS F and Au-
tonomous Aircraft. From a regulatory standpoint, a
clear distinction between the case study UAS on the
basis of their LoA would be required. The higher the
LoA of the UAS, the less the human RP is involved
in the operation and the more the UAS subsumes the
role of the RP. It follows that, as the LoA increases
so too does the degree of complexity of the UAS and
in turn, greater safety assurance is required of the
UAS hardware and software components that perform
the safety critical functions previously provided by a
human RP. This assurance can be provided through
more rigorous standards on the design, implementa-
tion, testing and operation of the UAS. The training
and licensing requirements on the RP will also depend
on the LoA of the UAS, thus, clear distinctions are
required.
The ICAO definition of Autonomous Aircraft was
consistently mapped to the same LoA as that deter-
mined for UAS A, UAS E and UAS F. There are sig-
nificant differences in the capability and complexity
of these three case study UAS. Interestingly enough,
UAS A corresponds to the earliest and most prim-
itive of UAS, whilst UAS F corresponds to a much
more complex system yet to be fielded in reality. This
result is illustrative of the diversity of potential inter-
pretations of the ICAO definition of an Autonomous
Aircraft. A definition of an Autonomous Aircraft that
is less open to interpretation is required.
4.3 Assessing UAS Modes of Operation
An Autonomous Operation is defined by ICAO as “an
operation during which a remotely-piloted aircraft is
operating without pilot intervention in the manage-
ment of the flight”. (ICAO 2011) Numerous modes of
operation have been defined for UAS (refer to Table
4 of Appendix A). Such modes of operation imply an
UAS of a minimum LoA.
The implied LoA for the modes of operation pro-
posed by Huang (2008) and for the ICAO concept
of an Autonomous Operation are assessed using the
same LoA frameworks analysed in Section §4.1. The
results are summarised in Table 5 in Appendix A. For
convenience, the definitions of the different modes of
operation proposed by Huang (2008) can be found in
Table 4.
As can be observed in Table 5, the operational
mode of Remote Control is consistently assigned to
the lowest LoA across all assessment frameworks. The
LoA associated with the ICAO concept of an Au-
tonomous Operation corresponds well with that de-
termined for a Fully Autonomous UAS, as defined
by Huang (2008). Up to nine LoA could be associ-
ated with the concept of a Semi Autonomous mode of
UAS operation. Semi Autonomous would encompass
the vast majority of all UAS operations. This class of
operations would include UAS of significantly differ-
ent LoA, and in turn, capability and complexity. It is
concluded that the classification provided by Huang
(2008) is unlikely to provide a suitable partitioning of
the different types of autonomous UAS operations for
use within regulations.
5 Discussion on a Regulatory Definition of
Autonomy
In this section we briefly explore some of the issues
in the development of a LoA framework specifically
for use in the safety regulation of UAS. Clothier &
Williams (2012) present a set of criteria for the eval-
uation of classification frameworks used in safety reg-
ulations. The same set of criteria can be used to
evaluate the LoA assessment frameworks and their
suitability for use in the regulation of UAS.
5.1 Context
As stated by Clothier & Williams (2012), all classi-
fication frameworks have a purpose and this purpose
influences their design. The existing LoA assessment
frameworks have been developed for a wide variety of
purposes, primarily for analysis of mission or opera-
tional capability. Subsequently, the properties used
to distinguish one LoA from that of the next reflect
differences within the specific context. As an exam-
ple, the ability to declare enemy ground targets and
establish their intent has little relevance in determin-
ing the LoA for application in civil aviation safety
regulations. Within the context of aviation safety reg-
ulation the LoA need to be distinguished on the basis
of their impact on the safety of UAS operations. Es-
tablishing a relationship between safety and the LoA
of a system will require assumptions in relation to
the missions and environments in which the UAS are
operated (see discussion Section §5.5).
5.2 Scale
An ordinal scale is recommended for a regulatory
specification of the LoA of UAS. This would allow reg-
ulators to “rank” UAS on the basis of their LoA and
would serve to divide the continuum of UAS LoA into
a finite number of mutually exclusive classes. Regu-
lations could then be developed and promulgated for
each class of autonomy in line with the safety and
complexity of the system. As discussed in Clothier
& Williams (2012), a regulatory classification should
be comprehensive, i.e., capable of providing a com-
plete, contiguous and mutually exclusive partition-
ing of UAS across all foreseeable types. Therefore,
the range of the LoA scale should cover all potential
cases, from no autonomy through to systems such as
that defined by case study UAS F. It is evident that
highest LoA of some of the reviewed scales do not
consider the possibility of autonomous systems which
are completely independent of a human operator.
5.3 Number of Levels
The more levels defined on the LoA scale, the higher
the resolution and the greater ability to distinguish
between differences in the LoA of UAS. Increasing
the resolution has the potential to increase the level
of flexibility in the regulation of autonomous systems,
however, it can increase the regulatory development
effort and the complexity of the regulatory classifica-
tion scheme.
The number of levels defined along the measure-
ment scale can have a significant impact on the effec-
tiveness and practicality of the assessment framework.
If too few LoA are defined, then the assessment frame-
work may not be able to distinguish between systems
that have a noticeable/significant difference in their
respective LoA. In the context of aviation safety reg-
ulations, insufficient resolution can result in a failure
to distinguish differences in the safety performance
of UAS. Conversely, a measurement scale with too
many levels would make the framework impractica-
ble to implement. The ideal number of levels is the
minimum number needed to distinguish between LoA
where there is a significant difference in the safety-
performance of the systems. Establishing the rela-
tionship between a LoA and the safety performance
of the UAS is beyond the scope of this paper. It is
important to note that although many of the scales
are labelled linearly (e.g., assigned the labels 0, 1, 2...)
this does not mean that the relationship between LoA
is also linear.
5.4 Component Properties
The set of properties used to determine a LoA should
be the simplest and most concise set necessary to dis-
tinguish differences in the safety-performance of the
systems. The terms concise and simple are included
to reflect pragmatic requirements on the regulatory
framework for UAS and to simplify the assessment
process. For example, the assessment framework pro-
posed by Barber & Martin (1999) requires measure-
ments of how often (% of decisions) and how much
(% of time) the RP intervenes in the decision mak-
ing of the UAS. Such assessments would be sensitive
to changes in the mission, task or environment, can
be time consuming to evaluate, and are not measures
that can be easily verified by a regulatory authority.
5.5 Level of System Complexity
The component properties used to describe auton-
omy have included properties belonging solely to the
machine, properties of the human and the machine,
emergent properties of the HMS, or emergent proper-
ties of the HMS operation. Thus, autonomy has been
assessed at numerous different levels of an hierarchi-
cal systems model describing an UAS. This leads to
the question as to what level of complexity in the rep-
resentation of the UAS should the LoA be assessed?
UAS autonomy could be assessed at an operational
level, and in so doing take into consideration the com-
plexity of the mission and environment performed by
the UAS. An example of this level of representation
is the concept of Contextual Autonomous Capabil-
ity (Huang 2008). A high level requirement for UAS
is that they operate seamlessly within the existing
airspace system. This high level requirement could be
used to establish categories or classes of mission and
environment (e.g., UAS operations under visual flight
rules and under visual meteorological conditions ver-
sus UAS operations in accordance with instrument
flight rules), for which “operational” LoA for UAS
could be assessed.
UAS LoA could also be assessed in relation to the
functions performed by the physical UAS or its com-
ponent sub-systems. In civil aviation safety regula-
tions flight critical or safety critical functions are de-
termined within the “aircraft system”. Safety critical
functions can be determined below the operational
system level by assuming that the relationships be-
tween measures of functional performance and the op-
erational risks are largely independent of a particular
mission or environment. For example, a loss of control
poses a risk to those people on-board an aircraft irre-
spective of the mission or environment in which the
aircraft is being operated. In such a case, the control
function could be classified as having a catastrophic
failure condition. From a regulatory perspective, the
LoA could be defined in relation to such safety criti-
cal functions. Existing function classifications such as
those defined in“Part 1309” system safety regulations
(FAA 1988, EASA 2012) could be used.
5.6 The Assessment Process
The vast majority of the literature reviewed provided
limited or no guidance as to how a LoA scheme could
be applied in practice (i.e., the actual measurements
required and how they could be aggregated). As
described by Clothier & Williams (2012), the LoA
measurement scale/scheme and the assessment pro-
cess are equally important components in any clas-
sification framework. If the LoA assessment process
is onerous, ambiguous, or overly complex the likely
outcome is a miss classification. In the context of
aviation safety regulations a miss classification is it-
self an hazard. An assessment of the LoA of a system
must be easily verified by a regulatory authority.
5.7 Adaptive Autonomy
The LoA of an UAS may vary with operating con-
ditions (normal / abnormal / emergency conditions),
for particular functions, and/or phases of flight. A
methodology will need to be in place to ensure that
the safety regulations provide adequate coverage for
such systems. This may include the system conditions
or process for changing the LoA of the UAS. For ex-
ample, should the UAS have the ability to change its
own LoA autonomously? Under some circumstances
this may be desirable (e.g., in those situations where
the communications link between the UA and the
ground control station are lost). If so, what should
the safety assurance requirements be for such a capa-
bility?
6 Conclusions
Civil aviation safety regulations and guidance mate-
rial classify Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) as ei-
ther Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) or
Autonomous Aircraft Systems (AAS). This distinc-
tion is based on the premise that the effective safety
risk management of UAS is dependent on the degree
of autonomy of the system being operated. However,
it is found that there is no consensus on the concept of
autonomy, on how it can be measured, or on the na-
ture of the relationship between Levels of Autonomy
(LoA) and the safety-performance of UAS operations.
Existing LoA assessment frameworks do not pro-
vide a consistent classification of the six generic case
study UAS nor of the ICAO concept of an Au-
tonomous Aircraft. It was found that the existing
LoA assessment frameworks, when applied to the case
study UAS, do not provide a consistent basis for dis-
tinguishing between the regulatory classes of RPAS
and AAS. It was also found that the existing reg-
ulatory definition of an Autonomous Aircraft is too
broad, covering UAS of significantly different levels of
capability and system complexity. Within the context
of aviation safety regulations, a new LoA assessment
framework for UAS is required.
This is not a surprising outcome as none of the
existing LoA frameworks were developed for use in
a safety or regulatory context. A new LoA as-
sessment framework will require a clear relationship
between autonomous system capability/functionality
and safety performance to be established. This needs
to be first established at the operational level (i.e.,
taking into consideration the mission and environ-
ment).
The higher the LoA of the UAS, the more it
subsumes the functions of the human remote pilot.
Hence, the more complex the UAS becomes. A wide
range of methods for implementing higher LoA in the
hardware and software components of an UAS have
been successfully demonstrated. Complex high-level
decision making is already being achieved through
the use of neural networks, agent-based architectures
and probabilistic reasoning. This poses a significant
challenge to regulators who must certify such imple-
mentations as being “safe”. The default performance
benchmark is that of the human pilot that has been
replaced. Not only does this performance benchmark
need to be quantified but new tools for use in the cer-
tification process need to be developed. These tools
must be capable of exercising the behaviour of the
system across a wide range of missions and operating
conditions (normal/abnormal/emergency).
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A Concepts for UAS Autonomy
Concept Definition
Automatic / Auto-
mated
The execution of a pre-defined process or event that requires UAV pilot initiation
and/or intervention e.g. automated take-off/landings, way-point navigation, auto-
pilots, pre-programmed manoeuvres etc. (TC 2008)
the automatic performance of scripted actions. (ASTM 2007)
In the unmanned aircraft context, an automated or automatic system is one that,
in response to inputs from one or more sensors, is programmed to logically follow
a pre-defined set of rules in order to provide an outcome. Knowing the set of rules
under which it is operating means that its output is predictable. (UKMoD 2011)
fully preprogrammed and act repeatedly and independently of external influence or
control. An automatic system can be described as self-steering or self- regulating
and is able to follow an externally given path while compensating for small devia-
tions caused by external disturbances. However, the automatic system is not able
to define the path according to some given goal or to choose the goal dictating its
path. (USDoD 2011)
Autonomy the ability of the machine to interpret its environment and make decisions that
result in unscripted actions. (ASTM 2007)
A UMS’s [Unmanned System] own ability of integrated sensing, perceiving, analyz-
ing, communicating, planning, decision-making, and acting/executing, to achieve
its goals as assigned by its human operator(s) through designed Human-Robot
Interface (HRI) or by another system that the UMS communicates with. UMS’s
Autonomy is characterized into levels from the perspective of Human Independence
(HI), the inverse of HRI. (Huang 2008)
The ability to execute processes or missions using on-board decision making ca-
pabilities. No intervention by UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle] crew members is
required. An autonomous UAV would be capable of dynamic mission manage-
ment that is not scripted. It would depend on intelligent reasoning and deliberate
behaviour for the ability to cope with uncertainty i.e. self-governance. (TC 2008)
the quality of being autonomous; self-determination. (FAA 2011)
the condition or quality of being self governing. When applied to UAS, autonomy
can be defined as UASs own1 ability of integrated sensing, perceiving, analyzing,
communicating, planning, decision-making, and acting/executing, to achieve its
goals as assigned by its human operator(s) through designed Human-Robot In-
terface (HRI) or by another system that the UAS communicates with. (Kendoul
2011)
the capability of the system to make decisions based upon an evaluation of the
current situation (often referred to as situation awareness). (CAA-UK 2012)
Autonomous An autonomous system is capable of understanding higher level intent and direction.
From this understanding and its perception of its environment, such a system is
able to take appropriate action to bring about a desired state. It is capable of
deciding a course of action, from a number of alternatives, without depending on
human oversight and control, although these may still be present. Although the
overall activity of an autonomous unmanned aircraft will be predictable, individual
actions may not be. (UKMoD 2011)
not controlled by others or by outside forces; independent judgment. (FAA 2011)
A UAS is defined to be autonomous relative to a given mission (relational notion)
wherein it accomplishes its assigned mission successfully, within a defined scope,
with or without further interaction with human or other external systems. A UAS
is fully autonomous if it accomplishes its assigned mission successfully without any
intervention from human or any other external system while adapting to operational
and environmental conditions. (Kendoul 2011)
self-directed toward a goal in that they do not require outside control, but rather
are governed by laws and strategies that direct their behavior. ...An autonomous
system is self- directed by choosing the behavior it follows to reach a human-directed
goal. ...autonomous systems may even optimize behavior in a goal-directed manner
in unforeseen situations (i.e., in a given situation, the autonomous system finds the
optimal solution). (USDoD 2011)
that perceives its environment and determines if this affects its goals, and it takes
action to ensure as far as practicable (and safe) that its goals will be achieved. It
reasons about its course of action from a number of alternatives, to achieve these
goals without recourse to human oversight and control. (CAA-UK 2012)
Table 1: Autonomy and related concepts defined in the context of UAS
1own implies independence from human or any other external system. (Kendoul 2011)
Reference Number
of Levels
Scale Basis for Scale
Sheridan &
Verplank
(1978)
10 Ordinal Autonomy scale based on human-machine role in decision making.
Riley (1989) 12 Ordinal Autonomy scale is based on the degree of control/authority the
machine has over the world (inclusive of the operator).
Billings
(1991)
7 Ordinal Autonomy scale is based on the pilot role in the control and man-
agement of system. The control and management continuum is de-
scribed in terms of “the degree of direct or immediate involvement
of the pilot.” Olson & Wuennenberg (2001) use the scale to specify
requirements on the pilot-aircraft interface for UAS.
Hasslacher &
Tilden (1994)
N/A Interval A level of autonomy is measured in terms of a Survival Signature
Space which is the weighted linear combination of measurements
made with respect to the three independent capability vectors of
mobility, acquisition, and protection.
Endsley &
Kaber (1999)
10 Ordinal LoA ‘taxonomy’ is based on the assignment of tasks/functions to
a human operator and/or computer. The tasks/functions were de-
fined as monitoring, generating, selecting, and implementing.
Barber &
Martin (1999)
N/A Ratio Classification based on how often (% of decisions) and how much
(% of time) an agent intervenes in the decision making of the robot.
Parasuraman
et al. (2000)
N/A Interval Level of automation based on the scheme proposed by Sheridan &
Verplank (1978) but expressed in relation to the four independent
functions of information acquisition, information analysis, decision
selection, and action implementation.
Clough (2002) 11 Ordinal Level of autonomy defined in relation to the combination of three
independent functions of perception/situational awareness, analy-
sis/decision making, and communication/cooperation. The frame-
work is used by Sholes (2007) to assess the autonomy of UAS.
Taylor et al.
(2002)
6 Ordinal Level of autonomy defined based on the combined dimensions of
pilot authority and contractual authority. A modified version of
this scheme is presented by Hill et al. (2007) for describing UAS
human-system interaction.
Proud et al.
(2003)
8 Ordinal Level of autonomy defined in relation to four independent dimen-
sions reflecting the decision making processes of Observe, Orient,
Decide and Act (OODA). Scheme is based on that developed by
Parasuraman et al. (2000), Clough (2002)
Huang,
Messina &
Albus (2007)
11 Ordinal LoA relates to the Human Interaction (HI) axis of the ALFUS Con-
textual Autonomous Capability framework. This axis is described
as “the ability for the UMS to identify and communicate and/or ne-
gotiate with humans and/or other entities.” A consistent measure-
ment framework for the HI axis is difficult to identify from within
the various published works. Five levels of HI are defined in (Huang,
Pavek, Ragon, Jones, Messina & Albus 2007). Table 1 of (Huang,
Messina & Albus 2007) describes the measurement of HI in terms
of the % of interaction time and defines eleven “reference levels” of
HI.
Galster et al.
(2007)
8 Ordinal Classification is based on the degree of operator control over the
UAS.
Kendoul
(2011)
11 Ordinal Similar to the concept of Contextual Autonomy presented in the
ALFUS framework, where the LoA of UAS is “characterised by the
missions that the UAS is capable of performing (Mission Complex-
ity or MC), the environments within which the missions are per-
formed (Environment Complexity or EC), and independence from
any external system including human element (External System In-
dependence or ESI)”. The LoA is determined from the ability of the
UAS to perform the independent functions of guidance, navigation
and control for a specified mission and environment.
USDoD
(2011)
4 Ordinal Autonomy scale is defined in relation to the degree of interaction
between human control and the machine motions.
Insaurralde &
Lane (2012)
N/A Interval Autonomy scale is defined in relation to the five independent con-
texts of: itself, system, user, environment, and norm. The five con-
texts are measured in terms of the ability of the system to perform
the functions of Observe-Orient-Decide-Act-Check (OODAC). The
level of autonomy for each context is determined by the weighted
average of the measures for each of the OODAC functions.
Table 2: Autonomy scales identified in the Literature
Case Study UAS Autonomous
Autonomy Scale UAS A UAS B UAS C UAS D UAS E UAS F Aircraft2
Sheridan & Verplank (1978) I I I VIII IX X VII, VIII,
IX, X
Riley (1989) XII I VII, VIII IX XI XII XII
Billings (1991) VII I, II III, IV, V V, VI VII VII VII
Endsley & Kaber (1999) III I, II II, III NC IX, X X X
Clough (2002) II I III NC NC X, XI X, XI
Taylor et al. (2002) - I NC IV, V, VI - - -
Huang, Messina & Albus (2007)3 NC I NC X XI - -
Galster et al. (2007) VIII I V VI, VII VIII VIII VIII
Kendoul (2011) II I NC NC NC XI XI
USDoD (2011) - I III III, IV - - -
Table 3: Assessment of the LoA of the case-study UAS
2 Defined by ICAO (2011)
3 Human Interaction (HI) as defined in Table 1 of Huang, Messina & Albus (2007)
Reference Term Definition
Clough
(2002)
Remotely piloted The UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] is simply a remotely piloted aircraft
with the human operator making all decisions.
Remotely oper-
ated
The human allows the UAV to do the piloting, but outer loop decisions are
made by the human (like where to go and what to do once there). The UAV
is a “mother-may-I” system, asking the human permission to do tasks.
Remotely super-
vised
The human allows the UAV to execute its own tasks, only taking command
if the UAV fails to properly execute them.
Fully autonomous The UAV receives goals from the humans and translates that into tasks
which it does without human intervention. The UAV has authority to
make all decisions.
ASTM
(2007)
Semi autonomous ... mode of control4 of a UAS where the pilot executes changes and conducts
the mission through a flight management system interface. Without this
input, the UAS will perform pre-programmed automatic operations. This
can, but might not, include some fully autonomous functions (like takeoff,
landing, and collision avoidance).
Fully autonomous ... mode of control of a UAS where the UAS is expected to execute its
mission, within the pre- programmed scope, with only monitoring from the
pilot-in- command. As a descriptor for mode of control, this term includes:
(1) fully automatic operation, (2) autonomous functions (like takeoff, land-
ing, or collision avoidance), and (3) “intelligent” fully autonomous opera-
tion.
Huang
(2008)
Remote control A mode of UMS [Unmanned System] operation5 wherein the human oper-
ator controls the UMS on a continuous basis, from a location off the UMS
via only her/his direct observation. In this mode, the UMS takes no initia-
tive and relies on continuous or nearly continuous input from the human
operator.
Teleoperation A mode of UMS operation wherein the human operator, using sensory feed-
back, either directly controls the actuators or assigns incremental goals on
a continuous basis, from a location off the UMS.
Semi-autonomous A mode of UMS operation wherein the human operator and/or the UMS
plan(s) and conduct(s) a mission and requires various levels of HRI. The
UMS is capable of autonomous operation in between the human interac-
tions.
Fully autonomous A mode of UMS operation wherein the UMS accomplishes its assigned mis-
sion, within a defined scope, without human intervention while adapting to
operational and environmental conditions.
ICAO
(2011)
Autonomous oper-
ation
An operation during which a remotely-piloted aircraft is operating without
pilot intervention in the management of the flight.
Table 4: UAS modes of operation
4mode of control is defined as the means the pilot uses to direct the activity of the UAS. Modes include remote
control, semi autonomous and fully autonomous. The remote control mode of operations is not explicitly
defined.(ASTM 2007)
5mode of operation defined as the human operator’s ability to interact with a UMS to perform the operator
assigned missions.(Huang 2008)
UAS Modes of Operation6 Autonomous
Autonomy Scale Remote Cont Teleop Semi Auto Fully Auto Operation7
Sheridan & Verplank (1978) I I, II, III II, III, IV,
V, VI
VII, VIII, IX,
X
VII, VIII, IX,
X
Riley (1989) I II, III, IV,
V, VI, VII
VIII, IX, X,
XI
XII XII
Billings (1991) I II, III, IV IV, V, VI,
VII
VII VII
Endsley & Kaber (1999) I II III, IV, V,
VI, VII, VIII,
IX
X X
Clough (2002) I II, III II, III, IV,
V, VI, VII,
VIII, IX, X
XI X, XI
Taylor et al. (2002) I I III, IV, V NC -
Huang, Messina & Albus (2007)8 I NC II, III, IV,
V, VI, VII,
VIII, IX, X
XI XI
Galster et al. (2007) I , II II, III III, IV, V,
VI, VII
VII, VIII VIII
Kendoul (2011) I I, II II, III, IV,
V, VI, VII,
VIII, IX, X
XI XI
USDoD (2011) I I II, III, IV - -
Table 5: Assessment of the LoA of UAS for different modes of operation
6 Defined by Huang (2008)
7 Defined by ICAO (2011)
8 Human Interaction (HI) from Table 1 Huang, Messina & Albus (2007)
